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Introduction
The South Caucasus is a sensitive region, as it was during the time of the Soviet Union, in terms of loyalty and respect towards each other, and especially treatment of national minorities. There are several reasons for this, such as religious diversity, ethnic enclaves, and the status of the national minorities in all three republics. That is why at the sunset of the Soviet regime the region became more vulnerable. Some analysts even assume that waves of ethno-political conflicts in the late 1980s initiated the breakdown of the Soviet Union. 1 Thus, these problems helped lay the foundation for future insecurity and instability in the South Caucasus.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the three states of the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, have shared very similar security problems and challenges. Scarcity of democratic institutions, lack of economic sovereignty, and high levels of corruption were, and still are, the key internal threats for all of them.
Nevertheless, it seems that predominantly Georgia among these three states succeeded in taking steps to fight corruption, establish democratic institutions, and transform its economy to a more liberal environment. In the mean time, corruption in Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly in the lower levels of government, is still cherished as the Soviet Union's cultural heritage, and democracy and economy are far from Western standards.
While the situation concerning the states' internal security problems have mostly intrinsic causes, the main issues of regional insecurity and instability are dependent on a more collaborative approach among the states. 2 The key driving factors of regional instability and insecurity remain the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazian and 2 South Ossetian conflicts. Another major problem is growing tensions in RussianGeorgian relations. Historically established negative Armenian-Turkish relations are also cause for concern. The Iranian nuclear program has an impact on the region as well and makes the situation more complex. This paper will examine these issues and will propose solutions that will enhance regional security and stability.
Unresolved Conflicts
To be sure, any conflict has far reaching consequences and the worst case scenario is one where conflict is considered to be as unresolved or frozen and hostile parties remain in a situation of neither peace nor war. The unresolved Nagorno
Karabakh, Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts are undoubtedly the main pressing problems in the South Caucasus and keys to regional security and stability. 3 One may struggle to explain why people, who have lived next to each other for many years and shared the same culture and traditions, suddenly displayed hostility towards each other.
Meanwhile detection of the real roots and causes can often be difficult because of hidden problems and their depth.
The South Caucasian conflicts have a few aspects that make them more difficult in terms of approaches that have to be taken into account while resolving them. First of all, it is often argued as to what kind of conflicts they are: territorial, ethno-political, or the combination of both. 4 Second, the problems go even deeper when it comes to the question on which principle of international law the solution of conflicts will be based: on the basis of territorial integrity or the people's right to self-determination. 5 Third, in the Nagorno Karabakh case the position of the latter in the negotiating process is represented by the Armenian government. Azerbaijan does not want to see Nagorno
Karabakh around the negotiating table as a negotiating party. However, any time before 3 and after each negotiation round takes place, Armenian officials have consultations with the Nagorno Karabakh government by informing the latter about ongoing negotiation processes. 6 Even though Azerbaijan does not accept Nagorno Karabakh's presence in the negotiating process, in 1994, a ceasefire agreement was signed by three respective representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and unrecognized the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic. 7 Thus, after many years of negotiations these fundamental questions relating to the approaches of conflicts' resolution are not agreed by all parties involved in conflicts.
Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
The roots of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict go back to the early period of the establishment of the Soviet regime in South Caucasus and formation of three Soviet Karabakh Republic signed a ceasefire. 10 Nevertheless, Azerbaijani authorities do not consider the signed document as an official peace agreement and the situation has become more fragile and the menace of war increases daily.
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After signing the ceasefire in 1994 the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chairs Russia, USA, and France) took responsibility in terms of settling the conflict and negotiations are held in this framework since that date. 11 For the whole period of the negotiating process several options were proposed by the co-chairs. None of the proposed options were satisfying for either side and there is not one on which both sides totally agree.
Currently, negotiations are held on the "Madrid Proposals". Co-chairs presented this document in November, 2007. 12 Even though the above mentioned document is a basis for negotiations there are still many questions and points that parties must come to agreement on. The OSCE Minsk Group is the only internationally mandated body within the framework of which negotiations are held. The Minsk group has the means to get this issue solved and it uses all available assets to achieve progress in the negotiation process. The only problem which is also often mentioned by the co-chairs is that parties do not show enough willingness to achieve progress in the negotiation process.
Despite the ongoing negotiations, the current situation on the whole border perimeter between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabakh is very unstable and strained to the possible limits. The border line especially between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh is under constant fire from all types of small arms, as well as heavy caliber weapons. There is no single day or even hour when shooting does not take place. For instance, while Armenia insists on pulling out snipers from the border and refusing to employ special troops for subversive activities, Azerbaijan violently uses them. 13 As a result, losses from both sides bring difficulties in the negotiating process and mediators often, instead of concentrating on the resolution of the conflict, are involved in the investigation processes. According to the Ministry of Defense of 6 Armenia, for the last year Azerbaijan broke ceasefire more than 16300 times. 14 Consequently, in some places, civilian population became a target as well and losses among them were unavoidable.
The situation is aggravated any time a meeting of presidents takes place. Simple analysis shows that for the last two years it became a norm to anticipate Azerbaijani Special Forces actions right after the next negotiation round is done. Tactical actions on the ground are strongly supported by the top Azerbaijani authorities and official announcements such as "war is unavoidable and this is the only way to get Karabakh back" are an inseparable part of Azerbaijani propaganda. 15 In the light of these developments, it is difficult to imagine that a negotiation process can assure enough guarantees and this extremely fragile peace could be maintained until final resolution of the conflict.
South Ossetian and Abkhazian Conflicts
South Ossetia
The issue of separating from Soviet Georgia and unifying with North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation, was cultivated in South Ossetians' hearts and minds for a long period of time. However, it became more public and openly demanded in 1990. These demands took place almost at the same time as the Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia abolished the South Ossetian autonomy status. 16 In response to the decision of Georgian authorities, the South Ossetians began to initiate steps to unite with North Ossetia. This was followed by an invasion of Georgian troops in South
Ossetia and brutal conflict with the use of force and cruel fighting in Georgia took place.
According to different statistics, more than 2,000 people were killed and thousands were 7 injured as well as the predominant part of infrastructure was damaged or completely destroyed. Gorbachev, wrote:
The roots of this tragedy lie in the decision of Georgia's separatist leaders in 1991 to abolish South Ossetian autonomy. Thus, it turned out to be a time bomb for Georgia's territorial integrity. Each time successive Georgian leaders tried to impose their will by force -both in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, where the issues of autonomy are similar -it made the situation worse. New wounds aggravated old injuries. 19 Apparently Mr. Gorbachev did some good while being the president of the USSR.
He initiated the process which brought independence to all former Soviet Republics. On the other hand, it was his responsibility to assure a peaceful initiation, and most importantly, a peaceful accomplishment of this process. There is no doubt that he and his companions failed to achieve this goal. And now instead of blaming someone and looking for a scapegoat, it is better to ask oneself why the foundations of the new states on the Soviet territory were done in a bloody way. The strategy of blaming the opposite side was taken by the Georgians as well. According to a Georgian MOD official, the South Ossetians previously rejected Tbilisi's decision to unilaterally resume a ceasefire.
Therefore, "the Georgian side has decided to restore constitutional order in the entire Republic with the special status of Union Republic associated with the Georgian SSR. 21 In 1931, Stalin finally made Abkhazia an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR and it remained so one until the Soviet Union broke down. 22 The main argument in making it part of Georgia was that Abkhazians and Georgians, and other national minorities living in that region, were very close to each other from cultural, economic, and geographical standpoints.
After gaining its independence, a radical nationalistic regime of Zviad Gamsakhurdia came to power in Georgia and restored the constitution from 1921.
According to this constitution Abkhazia was still granted autonomy. Nevertheless, the newly established regime did not specify the legal status of Abkhazia. Even though 
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It is essential to mention that the concern of final status remains open for all of the conflicts. This issue became a stumbling block in all three conflicts. As the negotiations go on, it becomes more obvious that consensus on all secondary issues could be easily found once the decision on final statuses is made. According to Georgian and Azerbaijani authorities, they are ready to offer a wide autonomy status to their respective parties. However, in all three cases the opposite sides only agree on recognition of their de-facto independence. Decisions with respect to some contested territories and return of refugees will be discussed after the most important question is solved and international guaranties are given.
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Russian-Georgian Relations
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia, like other regional countries, started a process of creating an independent statehood. Georgia's foreign policy was mainly oriented towards the West and the main efforts were focused on rapid integration into the EU and NATO. On the other hand, another major goal was to overthrow the Russian political influence within Georgia. Along with these processes, the Georgian government was constantly blaming Russia concerning its involvement and position in Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. The official position of the Georgian government with respect to Russia was to show on different international stages that it is only Russia who is against Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, it seems that
Georgian authorities did not seriously take into account the Russian factor and thought that it would be possible to solve problems concerning its territorial integrity without Russia. Another reason is that Georgians concluded that Russia had become a party to the conflict and therefore should not be playing the role of mediator.
In this confrontation process with Russia, Georgia's main leverage on it was Mr.
Saakashvili's demand that Russia withdraw all its troops stationed in Georgia, even though some of the earlier signed agreements with the preceding Georgian government were still in force. 28 Hence, notwithstanding the traditionally good bonds between Russian and Georgian nationalities, their relations went into deep crisis. As expected, Russia without any hesitation, used different assets of its national power and first closed the border with Georgia, placed a visa regime for Georgian citizens, and imposed an embargo against Georgian products. Diplomatic relations were downsized to a minimum. In the beginning of summer 2008 the situation escalated to the possible maximum. Daily skirmishes and small border incidents between Georgian and South
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Ossetian forces were pointing out that potential for the conflict revival was very high. 34 Certainly, in case this process succeeds, it will be very useful for Armenia as well, since Armenia is heavily dependent on Russian imports. Good news for Armenians could be the reopening of the rail road communication with Russia through Abkhazia.
However, Azerbaijan and Turkey will surely express their negative position in regard to this option because it will help to terminate Armenia's long term blockade. 35 However, these are just talks and in spite of the fact that the new Georgian authorities have recognized the role of Russia in the South Caucasus and proposed to start a negotiation process with Russia, Moscow is still very suspicious about beginning any talks yet. At least the former Russian President, Medvedev, has many times stressed that as long as Saakashvili is in office, no negotiations or any type of contacts will be initiated. 36 The citizens in both countries in turn are generally very negative concerning deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations. It is not only war that worsened RussianGeorgian relations. It was preceded with deportation of Georgians from Russia based on their ethnicity. In some other cases, in both countries, many innocent people were arrested and declared persona non grata because of being accused in espionage.
Unfortunately, the war became the biggest confrontation scene between the two countries. 37 Both countries will need to put in much effort in order to restore their relations. Russia must become a country that will take the first step towards establishment of the diplomatic relations and reduction of tensions between the two countries. Georgia has already done a lot in this direction; such as their promise that the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not be solved by military means. Moreover, statements about readiness for dialogue with Russia came from President Saakashvili's administration as well. 1993. 39 It is interesting to point out that the border was closed in 1993 whereas war between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been going for two years. The explanation for that is that by the end of 1993, Azerbaijan had lost its positions on the whole border perimeter and the Nagorno Karabakh blockade was finally ceased.
Armenia has always offered to establish political and economic relations with Revolution. 44 In fact the Iranian nuclear program and western help considered use of enriched uranium only for peaceful purposes. Besides, Iran has signed and ratified different treaties abdicating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 45 Nevertheless, different problems have been an inseparable part of Iran's nuclear program. Two main issues that make international organizations and democratic countries extremely concerned about this nuclear program are: 1) not enough guarantees are given to the international community even though Iranian officials always stressed that enrichment of uranium will be used only for peaceful purposes and not to produce a nuclear weapon. 2) Iran's constant announcements that it will strike Israel and erase it from the earth.
As Iran closed all doors in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency, especially for the last decade, the development of its nuclear program became more suspicious. Currently, talks in many formats are going on but it seems that Iran is not 20 ready to open its nuclear facilities for unbiased inspection. As a consequence, different international institutions have placed sanctions on Iran in order to isolate it from the progressive world. 46 The United States assumed the leading role in isolating Iran from the rest of the world. The government of the United States succeeded in convincing its allies and partners to follow its example and as expected the economic situation in Iran is worsening daily. It became much worse as the European Union imposed its own sanctions. 47 Nevertheless, according to some Iranian officials sanctions imposed on Iran were and are first, against European companies because these companies will have to leave their business. Thus, the sanctions will affect the Europeans before they reach
Iran. 48 Hence, the issue of effectiveness becomes essential and creates another choice, to be exact the use of military power, as a last resort. However, it is not affecting only Armenia but Azerbaijan and Georgia as well.
Georgia particularly, was benefiting from Iranian goods transfers through its territory and was also trading with Iran. It can benefit from Iranian oil and gas as well and have an alternative, as a result be not completely dependent on Azerbaijani energy projects.
With respect to Azerbaijan, it is necessary to mention that Azeri and Iranian ties are much tighter. First, there is an Azeri minority living on the border between Azerbaijan and Iran. Second, Azerbaijan is able to sustain its enclave Nachichevan only because of a single road that was built through Iran in order to connect Azerbaijan and its enclave.
Third, some energy projects were jointly invested by Azerbaijani and Iranian companies. 
Recommendations and Conclusion
All the above described processes are just main links in a long chain of problems.
At least for the next few decades the South Caucasus will remain unstable and another few decades will be necessary to change the people's minds, build the necessary confidence and trust among the nations. Nevertheless, the countries themselves can play a significant role in terms of improving the situation and making the region more secure, stable and attractive for foreign investments. All parties must understand that a solution of any problem is in their best interests and will. Georgia in turn can be a negotiator between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.
For some reasons the previous Georgian government was supporting the isolation process of Armenia conducted by Azerbaijan and Turkey. It may seem that once the border between Armenia and Turkey is opened, Georgia's role may decrease. But the real benefit for Georgia and its citizens will be the usage of the railroad and other communication infrastructure which will connect the western regions of Georgia with
Turkey in terms of being the shortest and cheapest route. At least with the reopening of the border between Armenia and Turkey, Georgia can acquire one more access point to the outside world through Armenia. Therefore, even if it does not come to a final solution of problems with Russia, Georgia still gains benefits. Besides, it will be viewed as a contribution to the security and stability of the region.
It is clear that the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations are the biggest problem in the region. The main subject as it was explained before is Nagorno Karabakh issue.
Protracted confrontation between these two countries brought negative consequences to both of them; less for one and more for another. As a result Armenia was isolated from the regional projects; from the other hand Azerbaijan had to invest much more in order to be able to transport its oil products to European consumers. It is very difficult to propose any approach that can assure normalization and establishment of the political and economic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the latter first of all insists on resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem within its territorial integrity and makes this demand as precondition for further progress. Second, the speedy militarization of Azerbaijan and acquisition of an enormous amount of weapon systems shows that Azerbaijan is preparing for war rather than peace. interests. The only way to get out of this situation is to achieve mutual consensus on key issues. Instead of dividing regional countries into two camps and seeing them on the opposite side of the barricade, it will be more effective to look at the region as a single, integrated security space. It is important to understand that the security of the region as a whole depends on the security of each of its states and national minorities.
The complexity of the current situation in South Caucasus is not a problem for only one or two countries. It has happened historically that all three states of South
Caucasus have overlapping interests, demands and claims towards each other. All three countries have something that is disputed at least between two of them. The situation and current political-military developments in the region are so complex that it is difficult to be optimistic with respect to the future of the region. The future of the South Caucasus, at least for the next two decades, is foggy and very unpredictable. Therefore, the region will remain unsecure and unstable as long as issues discussed in this paper remain unresolved. 
